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Abstract
The cultural exports of Japanese anime and manga have faced both praise and scorn in 
the Chinese market. Although the Chinese state generally regards these cultural artefacts 
as a negative influence, the adoption of visual techniques and concepts associated with 
Japanese popular culture has become common in China, particularly on the internet. This 
article seeks to understand the implications of the ‘glocalisation’ of Japanese anime and 
manga in China. It discusses how Japanese popular culture is perceived by the Chinese 
Communist Party and by the general public, and how the Chinese state has invested 
in its own domestic comics and animation industries in an attempt to curb the cultural 
flow from Japan. Through examining a satirical Chinese virtual character who is heavily 
influenced by Japanese graphic techniques and concepts, this article demonstrates that 
governments are not the final arbiters in matters of cultural influence and illuminates the 
complex nature of transnational cultural flows between China and Japan.
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Introduction
Popular culture is arguably one of Japan’s most successful and influential exports. Japanese 
comics and animations—known as manga and anime, respectively—attract many consumers 
worldwide. Manga and anime are often celebrated for the diversity and complexity of their 
themes which ‘represent every interest and aspect of Japanese society’, as well as for their 
striking visual elements.1 These strengths have propelled Japanese popular cultural exports 
to challenge the existing global cultural market on a large scale. From 1993 to 2003, the 
value of Japanese cultural exports tripled to USD$12.5 billion.2 In 2012, 60 per cent of 
the world’s animated cartoon series were Japanese anime.3 Furthermore, there are regular 
festivals, conventions and events that celebrate manga and anime all over the world.4 To many 
observers, this global popularity of Japanese popular culture came as a surprise. According 
to Gloria Goodale, manga and anime have ‘achieved what no other indigenous cultural 
expression has managed to do: become widespread enough to challenge America’s stranglehold 
on entertainment’.5 Japanese popular culture is thus defying the US-dominated global cultural 
market and challenging the existing hierarchy.
The consumption of Japanese popular culture, however, may be significantly larger than 
official market records suggest. This is largely because of the prevalence of illegal websites that 
provide manga and anime to viewers at little or no cost. To illustrate, a 2013 report by the 
Japanese Cultural Affairs Agency, which examined copyright infringement of Japanese cultural 
exports, estimated its annual losses caused by online piracy at 3.8 trillion yen (approximately 
USD$33.6 billion) in China alone.6 This brings attention not only to the high consumption 
of Japanese popular culture in China, but also to the considerable role the internet plays in its 
consumption.
Given the politicised nature of the Sino–Japanese relationship, questions are being asked 
about how the people and government of China respond to this dissemination of Japanese 
popular culture. This article suggests that in the current era of globalisation, the state has 
limited influence over matters of cultural dissemination. It argues that despite intentions to 
curb the flow of Japanese popular culture in China, the Chinese government has inadvertently 
helped foster and promote the very thing it was attempting to dispel. Although the state 
implemented policies that encouraged the production and consumption of Chinese domestic 
1 John A. Lent, ‘Far Out and Mundane: The Mammoth World of Manga’, Phi Kappa Phi Forum, vol. 84, 
no. 3, 2004, p. 40. 
2 Jim Frederick, ‘What’s Right with Japan’, Time Asia, 11 August 2003, http://web.archive.org/
web/20100403090055/http://www.time.com/time/asia/2003/cool_japan/story.html.
3 Anne Cooper-Chen, ‘Cartoon Planet: The Cross-Cultural Acceptance of Japanese Animation’, Asian 
Journal of Communication, vol. 22, no. 1, 2012, p. 44.
4 For example, there is the Comic Market in Tokyo, Animaga Expo in Melbourne, Anime Expo in Los 
Angeles, and Anime Festival Asia held in Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. 
5 Gloria Goodale, ‘Anime-ted Japan’, The Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 2005, http://www.csmonitor.
com/2005/0624/p12s01-alar.html.
6 ‘Bunkachō: Gurōbaru na chosakuken shingai he no taiō no kyōka jigyō: Kaigai ni okeru chosakuken 
shingai tō ni kansuru jittai chōs—Chūgoku. Kekka gaiyō’ [Cultural Affairs Agency of Japan: Strengthening 
Industries against Global Copyright Infringement: An Investigation of Matters Relating to Overseas  
Copyright Infringement—China. An Overview of Results], Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co., 
2013, p. 11.
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comics and animation, public demand and preference for Japanese anime and manga have 
persisted. This has ensured styles and concepts from Japanese popular culture have been 
developed and cultivated within the state-driven Chinese comics and animation industries.
Although Japanese influence is evident in Chinese comics and animation industries, this 
article is interested in the impact of anime and manga at a grassroots, or amateur, level. One 
way of illustrating this phenomenon is to examine the Japanese concept of moe (pronounced 
‘moh-eh’) in China, using the Chinese grassroots-created Green Dam Girl character as an 
example. Through analysis of this character and an associated derivative work, this article 
challenges ‘top-down’ understandings of cultural dissemination that overemphasise the role 
of the state. While it is undeniable that states have a certain degree of influence over cultural 
production and consumption within their borders, the extent of this influence may easily 
be overstated. In the current age where information gateways are no longer under the sole 
control of a narrow elite, the extent to which the state has any say over cultural dissemination 
is limited in ways that were inconceivable a generation ago. At least in some situations, 
individuals may in fact be the final arbiters in matters of cultural influence. Through expanding 
upon the works of Nissim Otmazgin and Eyal Ben-Ari, who see popular culture existing 
outside politics, this article aims to contribute to understanding the processes through which 
the state, internet technologies and fandom affect cultural glocalisation.7 As it is not within the 
scope of this article to provide a comprehensive historical development of Japanese popular 
culture, the subject matter will instead be contextualised within the dissemination of Japanese 
anime and manga in China.
Moe: Popularity and controversy
Observers of Sino-Japanese history and politics may be puzzled by the popularity of Japanese 
manga and anime in China. Aside from their thematic and visual strengths, one explanation 
may be the affective response referred to as moe. While its exact origins are unclear, this 
concept is thought to have developed within Japanese popular culture in the 1980s or 1990s. 
According to Patrick Galbraith, moe may be defined as ‘an affectionate response to fictional 
characters’.8 This means that moe is triggered by fictional characters; it does not exist in the 
character itself, but is found within the person who is responding to a character. Thus, certain 
characters may elicit strong emotions in people, depending on their preferences and past 
experiences. For example, someone who grew up watching the Japanese animation Pokémon 
may, years later, find themselves still drawn to and comforted by their favourite characters. In 
this situation, the Pokémon characters trigger moe in their fans. As this example suggests, the 
concept of moe is often referenced in association with manga and anime. It could be argued 
that there is some attractive quality within these fictional characters that elicits powerful 
emotions, thus leading to the rise in manga and anime around the world.
Nevertheless, moe remains an oft misunderstood and misrepresented concept. While 
popular English-language media has portrayed it as a bizarre and overly erotic phenomenon, 
7 Nissim Otmazgin and Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘Cultural Industries and the State in East and Southeast Asia’, in 
Popular Culture and the State in East and Southeast Asia, ed. Eyal Ben-Ari and Nissim Otmazgin, Rout-
ledge, London, 2013, p. 20.
8 Patrick W. Galbraith, The Moe Manifesto: An Insider’s Look at the World of Manga, Anime, and Gaming, 
Tuttle Publishing, North Clarendon, 2014, p.17.
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moe is not necessarily sexual.9 Instead, it may be considered ‘a desire for the fantastical, not the 
physical’.10 Therefore, moe is associated with ‘pure fantasy’, rather than with reality. Galbraith 
believes that this may be the reason some anime and manga have violent and pornographic 
content: ‘it [is] precisely because it is pure that it can give birth to such perverse and 
polymorphous possibilities’.11 A well-known example of such a phenomenon is Sailor Moon, 
a Japanese manga and anime series that achieved international popularity in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Though directed at a young female audience, this series contained violent themes 
and depictions of near-naked teenage girls. In this way, there is a contradictory juxtaposition 
of child-like innocence and adult desire in moe culture.
It is partly because of this tendency to touch upon mature themes that moe and Japanese 
popular culture have drawn criticism from both domestic and international observers. Notably, 
some of the most severe criticisms come from the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese 
official mainstream discourse—touted by the Chinese government, media and academics—
often frames these critiques in terms of their potential to harm children. Complaints have been 
made that manga and anime may distort definitions of beauty, encourage viewers to engage in 
aggressive and anti-social behaviour, and display offensive portrayals of non-Japanese Asian 
characters.12 While there is some validity to these claims, it would be incorrect to assume that 
all manga and anime are harmful to young viewers. Nevertheless, the government focused 
on such negative perceptions and used them as justification for its restriction of both online 
and offline access to Japanese popular culture in China. Following this, it implemented 
protectionist policies and promoted the production and consumption of its own domestic 
comics and animation products. Ironically, through this process the Chinese government 
played an instrumental role in the ‘glocalisation’ of Japanese popular culture within Chinese 
comics and animations; that is, a complex localising of globalised culture, which Robertson 
describes as ‘the simultaneity—the co-presence—of both universalizing and particularizing 
tendencies’.13
Japanese popular culture in China
To understand how this cultural glocalisation has been achieved, it is necessary to give a 
brief outline of the impact and reception of Japanese popular culture in China. The following 
paragraphs describe the popularity, influence and state control of manga and anime since the 
1990s. Particular attention is paid to the roles of the state, internet technologies and fandom.
9 In a 2010 episode of the US television show 30 Rock I titled ‘Klaus and Greta’, James Franco’s character 
describes his sexual relationship with a Japanese body pillow as moe.
10 Patrick W. Galbraith, ‘Moe: Exploring Virtual Potential in Post-Millennial Japan’, Electronic Journal of 
Contemporary Japanese Studies, 2009, no. 5, para. 30, http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2009/
Galbraith.html.
11 Galbraith, ‘Moe: Exploring Virtual Potential’, para. 30. 
12 Jinhui Meng, ‘Qiantan riben donghua’ [Brief Analysis on Japanese Animation], Qingnian wenxuejia, 
no. 18, 2012, p. 203; Yingshuang Zhu, ‘Qiantan riben dongman dui zhongguo daxuesheng jiazhiguan de 
yingxiang’ [Brief Analysis of the Impact of Japanese Manga and Anime on the values of Chinese University 
Students], Xue lilun, no. 33, 2011, p. 204; Pinyuan Zeng, ‘Lun riben dongman waijiao de zhexue pinkun’ [The 
Philosophy of Poverty on Japanese Manga and Anime Diplomacy], Riben yanjiu, no. 4, 2011, p. 122.
13 Roland Robertson, ‘Comments on the “Global Triad” and “Glocalization”’, in Globalization and Indig-
enous Culture, ed. Nobutaka Inoue, Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University, 
1997, para. 16, http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/global/15robertson.html.
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The 1990s saw a rapid rise in the proliferation of Japanese manga in China. During this 
period, there were several Chinese publishers offering cheap, low-quality, illegal versions 
of Japanese manga. These pirated publications were affordable to young readers with little 
spending power, and there were even cheaper options which allowed readers to pay a 
minimal fee to access manga at specialised stores.14 A notable and highly successful comic 
magazine at this time was Huashu Dawang, or Comic King. Recognising the demand for 
Japanese comics, the editors of this magazine chose to publish pirated content of the latest 
manga. They also recruited local Chinese artists to create their own manga-style work. 
These Japanese-influenced comics came to be known as xinmanhua, which means ‘new 
manga’ in Chinese. Most of these works were drawn by young, amateur artists who were 
fans of manga. Unlike traditional Chinese comics, xinmanhua utilised styles and techniques 
borrowed from manga, such as filmic angles, symbolic expressions and character design.15 
John Lent believes that these artists favoured the manga style because ‘it appeared to 
be modern, was more action oriented, captured the changing cultural trends in China, 
and sometimes provided opportunities for international recognition through manga 
competitions’.16
The publication of Comic King was forcefully terminated in 1994. Yongsheng Wang, its 
editor, describes the incident that appears to have served as a catalyst for the closure of the 
company, suggesting that a government official unfairly labelled a particular manga series 
as inappropriate reading material for children.17 It could be that this episode created a 
precedent that was extended to the perception of all Japanese manga. Once this view had 
been established in the official mainstream discourse, severe restrictions on imported manga 
were introduced to counteract this ‘Japanese invasion’ and manga publishing businesses closed 
rapidly as a result.18 It is unclear whether the negative perception of Japanese popular culture 
in China had developed of its own accord or was instigated by the state, but there is little 
doubt the Chinese government perpetuated it through restrictive policies. In this way, Japanese 
manga became increasingly difficult for the Chinese public to access.
The Chinese government began to invest in its own comic industry to fill the cultural void 
left by the absence of Japanese manga, and using the supposed moral deterioration of youth 
that led to social disobedience such as the Tiananmen Square incident as justification.19 In 
1995, President Jiang Zemin commented on the importance of producing domestic youth 
14 Matthew M. Chew and Lu Chen, ‘Media Institutional Contexts of the Emergence and Development of 
Xinmanhua in China’, International Journal of Comic Art, vol. 12, no. 2, 2010, p. 173.
15 Chew and Chen, p. 174.
16 John A. Lent, Asian Comics, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, 2015, pp. 36–7.
17 Yongsheng Wang, ‘Huashu dawang’ [Comic King], 28 August 2013, http://comic.qq.
com/a/20130828/010245.htm.
18 Chwen Chwen Chen, ‘The Growth of Manhua in China: An Overview’, China Media Observatory, no. 6, 
2010, p. 9; Qi Wang, ‘The Dilemma of Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy in China: A Case Study of Japanese Manga 
and Anime’, Master’s thesis, Lunds University, 2007, p. 25. 
19 Yoshiko Nakano, ‘Shared Memories: Japanese Pop Culture in China’, in Soft Power Superpowers, ed. 
Yasushi Watanabe,Taylor and Francis, New York, 2015, p. 122.
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entertainment that reflected the ideals of the ruling Communist Party.20 The 5155 project 
was the major initiative of this campaign. It established several state-sponsored comics 
publishers, series and magazines, many of which recruited xinmanhua artists who had worked 
on publications such as Comic King. The 5155 project allowed the government to police the 
content of Chinese comics and ensure that they adhered to Chinese morals and social norms. 
Non-Japanese styles and nationalistic content were encouraged and, at least in part, the project 
aimed to minimise the impact of manga on its impressionable viewers.21 While these ventures 
were initially quite successful, many comic artists left the industry due to poor pay. The 5155 
project collapsed in 2005 when its last remaining comics company accrued a deficit of over 
RMB1 million (AUD$160,000 at the time) in just half a year.22 The state could no longer 
afford to continue the project.
One of the contributors to the demise of the 5155 project may have been the internet. Since 
Japanese manga was no longer accessible through official means, many Chinese fans opted 
to consume pirated manga online.23 This suggests that many of the domestically produced 
comics were not well-received by the Chinese public, and the demand for Japanese manga 
was still strong. Further, talented local comic artists chose to share their works online. Indeed, 
the anonymity of the internet attracted xinmanhua artists who increasingly felt the pressure 
of strict publishing standards, and wished to create comics that challenged the status quo.24 
According to Lent, the shift to online production and dissemination of comics was pivotal for 
xinmanhua’s survival.25 In this way, the internet helped producers and consumers of manga and 
xinmanhua find each other.
Similarly to manga, Japanese anime has been labelled as harmful and unsuitable for 
Chinese consumption. Some of the notable movements against anime in recent years include 
an incident in 2014 when a Chengdu newspaper called for the boycott of the popular Japanese 
character Doraemon.26 A year later, the Chinese government released a blacklist of thirty-
eight forbidden animation series, all of which were of Japanese origin. According to the 
relevant official notice, these animations ‘induce juvenile delinquency [and contain] violence, 
pornography, terrorism, and content that endanger public morality’.27 Since this notice, 
Chinese video streaming websites have required a licence to show foreign television programs 
20 Zemin Jiang, ‘Wei shaoer tigong gengduo genghao de jingshen shiliang’ [Providing Children with 
More and Better Spiritual Sustenance], News of the Communist Party of China, 28 August 1995, http://cpc.
people.com.cn/GB/64162/124333/124356/125504/7429386.html.
21 Chew and Chen, pp. 177–8.
22 Ibid., p. 182.
23 Ibid., p. 180.
24 Ibid., p. 186.
25 John A. Lent, ‘Lianhuanhua’, Nona Arte, vol.1, no. 2, 2012, p. 15.
26 Jinpeng Cheng, ‘Jingti DuolaAmeng mengbi women de shuangyan’ [Do Not Be Blinded by Doraemon], 
Chengdu ribao, 25 September 2014, http://www.cdrb.com.cn/html/2014-09/25/content_2121344.htm.  
27 Shuo Yi, ‘Wenhua bu gongbu wangluo dongman chanpin “hei mingdan”’ [Ministry of Culture Publishes 
‘Blacklist’ of Online Anime], 10 June 2015, Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China, http://
www.mcprc.gov.cn/whzx/ggtz/201506/t20150610_441609.html.
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and films.28 The Chinese government appeared to create a moral panic to inhibit further 
dissemination of Japanese anime.
To combat the influence of Japanese anime, the Chinese government has promoted the 
production of its own domestically produced animations. It gave preferential tax treatment 
to many animation companies in 2010, established a national animation award in 2011 and 
offered studio space to animators free of charge.29 Television stations were encouraged to 
broadcast these animations, and so the airtime dedicated to domestic animation increased 
from none in 1994 to 4,534 hours in 2011.30 Thanks to these policies, the Chinese animation 
industry has experienced an unprecedented growth in the last decade. In January 2016 alone, 
Chinese animation companies produced thirty-eight animated series comprising 15,582 
minutes (approximately 260 hours) of material.31 Thus, government policies have led to China 
becoming the biggest producer of animated content in the world.
The Chinese animation industry, however, is fraught with problems. One of the more 
problematic issues is that many Chinese animations have been accused of plagiarism by 
observers from within and outside China. There are a number of animated series and films 
that closely resemble foreign works—especially Japanese ones. For example, an article in the 
Chinese newspaper People’s Daily claims the plot and character designs of the 2006 Chinese 
animation Chess King are facsimiles of those in the Japanese anime Yu-Gi-Oh! The 2007 series 
named Big Mouth DoDo appear to have borrowed the voice acting styles and character designs 
of Japan’s Crayon Shinchan, and the 2008 series Golden Hero bears a striking resemblance to 
the Japanese Ultraman.32 These and many similar cases have prompted an official from the 
Association of Japanese Animation to comment that a large number of Chinese animations 
are simply imitations of Japanese works.33 This could partly be because of the outsourcing of 
Japanese anime production in China, which has led to the training of local artists in Japanese 
styles.34 Also, what Western observers consider copyright infringement may be seen as a tribute 
or homage from a Chinese perspective. It could also simply be an attempt by Chinese producers 
to emulate the success of Japanese anime around the world, which is, ultimately, a recognition 
and acceptance of the Chinese audience’s preference for Japanese visual styles and stories.
28 Kerry Allen, ‘Japanese Comics that are Too Racy for Chinese Censors ... But Still Popular Online’, BBC, 
27 July 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-33652502.
29 John A. Lent and Ying Xu, ‘Chinese Animation: An Historical and Contemporary Analysis’, Journal of 
Asian Pacific Communication, vol. 23, no. 1, 2013, pp. 32–3.
30 Ken-chi Yamada, ‘Market Competition in the Animation Industry Between Japan and China: How to 
Face China’s Rising Interest in Promoting Domestically-Produced Animation’, NHK Broadcasting Culture 
Research Institute, 2013, p. 5, http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/reports/pdf/report_13020101.pdf.
31 ‘Guojia xinwen chuban guangdian zongju guanyu 2016 nian 1 yue quanguo guochan dianshi 
donghuapian zhizuo beian gongshi de tonggao’ [SARFT Announcements Regarding National Television 
Animation Production for January 2016], State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, 1 March 2016, 
http://www.sarft.gov.cn/art/2016/3/1/art_34_29882.html.
32 Xiao Yang, ‘Guochan donghua “lanpian” beizhi daoqu zhengfu butie’ [‘Bad’ Domestic Animated Film 
Accused of Stealing Government Subsidies], People’s Daily, 16 July 2015,  http://culture.people.com.
cn/n/2015/0716/c22219-27311809.html.
33 Yamada, p. 11.
34 Vincenzo De Masi, ‘Animation “Made in China”: Has the Invasion of Chinese Animation Products Be-
gun?’, China Media Observatory, vol. 3, 2010, p. 7.
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Green Dam Girl
Since the official restrictions on Japanese popular culture were put in place, the internet has 
played a key, if not vital, role in the dissemination of manga and anime in China. Therefore, 
although there are presumably numerous reasons the Chinese government promotes internet 
censorship, it could be argued that the restriction of public access to Japanese popular culture 
is one of its objectives. Based on this understanding, it is amusing that the Japanese-inspired 
Green Dam Girl (in Chinese: 绿坝娘/lǜ bà niáng) meme emerged within an online counter-
narrative in June 2009, a response to the Chinese government’s plans to pre-install the Green 
Dam Youth Escort (绿坝·花季护航/Lǜbà Huājì Hùháng) internet filtering software on 
all computers in China. In Chinese culture, the colour green is associated with health and 
morality. ‘Dam’ refers to the flood of information the software is attempting to hold back, 
while ‘Youth Escort’ suggests that it is intended to guide children while they are surfing the 
internet. The name of the Green Dam Youth Escort software clearly reveals the concerns the 
Chinese government at the time held for youth and the internet.
Apart from its many technical and security problems, this software was most heavily 
criticised for its potential to act as government spyware.35 Frustrated by these developments, 
Chinese internet users created the subversive Green Dam Girl character: a moe 
anthropomorphism, or a personification with moe-inducing features, of the Green Dam Youth 
Escort software.36 Moe anthropomorphisms are commonly seen in Japanese popular culture; 
anything from currency to nations may be depicted as cute and sexualised girls.37 Therefore, the 
Green Dam Girl is another example of the glocalisation—this time user-driven—of Japanese 
popular culture in China.
It is helpful to understand the Green Dam Girl as an internet meme. Richard Dawkins, 
who first conceptualised the meme, describes it as ‘a unit of cultural transmission’.38 Building 
on his ideas, Díaz defines an internet meme as a humorous ‘phrase, image or video … that 
spreads through the internet causing people to replicate it’.39 Indeed, the physical appearance 
and personality of the Green Dam Girl are encapsulated in a series of satirical images, stories, 
songs and games created by a diaspora of anonymous Chinese internet users. Like most 
internet memes, she does not have clear authorship or a standardised form, but is the result of 
successive transformations as this meme was spread.
This virtual character has some unusual qualities. First, although the Green Dam Girl 
is a creation of Chinese internet users, her image and personality have been inspired by 
techniques and concepts most associated with Japanese manga and anime. Visually, the Green 
Dam Girl is drawn in a typical manga or anime style. She is also one of many other moe 
35 Loretta Chao, ‘China Squeezes PC Makers: Beijing is Set to Require Web Filter That Would Cen-
sor “Harmful” Internet Sites’, The Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2009, http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB124440211524192081?mg=reno64->; Andrew Jacobs, ‘China Requires Censorship Software on New PCs’, 
The New York Times, 8 June 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/world/asia/09china.html?_r=2&.
36 https://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/Green_Dam_Girl.
37 For recent examples of moe anthropomorphisms, see Toshio Miyake, ‘History as Sexualized Parody: 
Love and Sex Between Nations in Axis Powers Hetalia’, in Rewriting History in Manga, ed. Nissim Otmazgin 
and Rebecca Suter, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2016, pp. 151–73.
38 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, p. 192.
39 Carlos Mauricio Castaño Díaz, ‘Defining and Characterizing the Concept of Internet Meme’, Revista 
CES Psicología, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 96.
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anthropomorphisms common in Japanese popular culture. In addition, as Chau points out, the 
terms used to describe this character are commonly heard among Chinese fans of Japanese 
popular culture; most, if not all, would be unfamiliar to people outside this subculture.40 
For example, the Japanese word tennen (Chinese pronunciation: tianran), meaning ‘natural 
airhead’, is used to describe the Green Dam Girl. To Chinese viewers outside manga and 
anime fandom, this word would be a source of confusion.41 Because of these connections 
with Japanese popular culture, the Green Dam Girl may be considered an example of the 
glocalisation of Japanese manga and anime in China. This adoption of Japanese artistic styles 
by informal Chinese internet users shows the large and disseminated impact of Japanese 
popular culture.
Unlike most memes on popular international community websites such as Reddit, which 
are characterised by their appeals to humour, the Green Dam Girl is, or was at least initially, 
strikingly subversive. As a moe anthropomorphism of the Green Dam Youth Escort software, 
her character captures the essence of the filtering software; everything from her clothes to 
personality reflects the anger of internet users towards this form of government control. 
Amusingly, her characteristics even hint at the flaws of the software. For example, the Green 
Dam Girl is colour blind because the image-filtering feature of the software is not very 
effective at recognising pornographic images. While it is designed to filter out images showing 
too much skin, it reportedly even blocks images of the orange-hued cat Garfield, while still 
allowing access to ostentatiously erotic websites.42 Therefore, Chinese internet users created the 
Green Dam Girl to mock the government in a satirical way.
Further, despite her appearance as a young teenager, the Green Dam Girl is often 
sexualised. She is commonly drawn wearing short skirts, but at times she is pictured in 
little-to-no clothing at all. In other cases, she may be found striking suggestive poses. Loretta 
Chau argues this sexualisation enables the Green Dam Girl to become a political tool which 
ironically attacks ‘the official narrative of protecting youth from pornography, with a sexual 
and young image of the software’.43 In this way, Chinese internet users playfully subvert the 
government’s plans to further restrict their online freedom.
Finally, many internet users created their own works appropriating this character, extending 
the Green Dam Girl to other genres and forms. According to an informative page about her 
on Baidu Baike, a Chinese online encyclopaedia, the Green Dam Girl has inspired the creation 
of myriad images, fan clubs, songs, computer games and even novels.44 These appropriations 
were created until the middle of 2012, showing that this character persisted long after the 
software she was based upon had been abandoned.
At first glance this virtual character may seem like any other image created in the style 
of Japanese anime and manga, but to comprehend the hidden symbolism within requires 
40 Chau, p. 78.
41 Ibid., p. 52.
42 ‘China’s Internet Porn Filter—No Garfield Please’, Independent, 30 June 2009, http://www.independent. 
co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/chinas-internet-porn-filter-no-garfield-please-1725411.html.
43 Chau, p. 73.
44 See: http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=L9Rfxoa7jpyiZl_RvdG1eLhp_G758lFuxJKqEKNEeYQbOzrXuK6Qpa
q-I9LzCyELIYWQb-Xv08blYyPJXjH07a.
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knowledge of both the Chinese language and modern Chinese history. There is no one 
definitive image of the Green Dam Girl, but there are some characteristics they all share. 
The images all depict a young girl wearing a hat and armband reminiscent of those of the 
Red Guards from the Cultural Revolution. Her hat shows an image of a river crab, which is 
a homonym for ‘harmony’ as well as internet slang for censorship. Her armband is inscribed 
with the characters for ‘discipline’, and she carries a paint bucket and brush with which she 
can paint over obscene content. In her arms are white rabbits, the software mascot, which may 
symbolise childhood innocence.
To summarise, the Green Dam Girl is the embodiment of a counter-narrative against 
Chinese internet censorship that began in 2009. This case is noteworthy not only because of its 
connections to Japanese popular culture, but also for the use of such foreign cultural imports to 
criticise and ridicule Chinese government actions. In this way, Chinese internet users were able 
to mock the government using elements of the very culture it was attempting to contain.
‘The Religion of Green Dam Girl’
In a further utilisation of moe to extend the Green Dam Girl counter-narrative, the video 
and song ‘The Religion of Green Dam Girl’ was created by internet users known only by their 
online pseudonyms. The video shows a compilation of manga and anime-type images of the 
Green Dam Girl, as could be found freely on the Chinese internet at the time of production, 
and is set to a Japanese song with its own original Chinese lyrics.45 The Japanese influence 
in this video is obvious: it appropriates the technology, music and themes from the original 
Japanese song. It is cultural borrowing in a microcosm.
The song is told entirely from the perspective of the Green Dam Girl, describing her 
loneliness in the ‘second dimension’, which refers to the virtual world in which she exists. 
She appears to be speaking to the computer user who has installed her software. By ‘gently 
press[ing] [her] power button’, the user may turn the computer on and be greeted by her 
smiling face. The Green Dam Girl yearns for their reunion when her program is not activated. 
But in fact, the line ‘You whisper to me that you never left’ suggests that they are never really 
apart. This may allude to the widespread belief that the Green Dam Youth Escort is a type of 
malicious software known as spyware, and so, figuratively speaking, the Green Dam Girl is 
always lurking in the background. Once she is activated, she and the computer user fly together 
and ‘witness the magnificence of distant lands’, referring to the act of browsing the internet. The 
Green Dam Girl holds the computer user’s hand with ‘fingers unlocked’, guiding the way ‘into 
heaven’, which suggests that she is guiding the user to safe websites, as she is programmed to do.
These lyrics demonstrate how the creators of Green Dam Girl have adopted the Japanese 
concept of moe. Galbraith’s definition of moe as ‘an affectionate response to fictional characters’ 
aptly describes the longing tenderness with which the lyricist writes about the Green Dam 
Girl.46 The lines ‘My soft and tired heart calls for you. It struggles and strains as it calls for you’, 
written from the perspective of the Green Dam Girl, expose the need of the protagonist to be 
45 For a video of ‘The Religion of Green Dam Girl’, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtE_n2CdPpg. 
The original Japanese song Kokoro was sung by a Vocaloid, a singing voice synthesiser by the Japanese 
company Yamaha, with which users may input their own melody and lyrics to create their own songs. 
Kokoro was a popular song which was later novelised and adapted for the stage. See: http://www.nicovideo.
jp/watch/sm2500648.
46 Galbraith, The Moe Manifesto, p. 17.
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desired by her. Similarly, the lines ‘If you are with me I am in heaven’ and ‘Let’s smile in our 
bliss’ reinforce the sense that the two characters are happy together—perhaps even in what we 
may call a mutual loving relationship. Here, we can see that the lyrics are designed—whether 
intentionally or not—to evoke pleasant and even romantic feelings for this fictional character. 
These points affirm the writer’s devotion to and affection for the Green Dam Girl, reiterating 
the moe features in this song.
The sexual innuendos present in this song are also an indication of moe. The sexualisation 
of the young Green Dam Girl reflects Galbraith’s ideas on the boundary between child-like 
innocence and adult desire which moe so comfortably transgresses.47 For example, in the music 
video, the line which describes how the computer user may ‘gently press [her] power button’ 
is accompanied by an image of a blushing Green Dam Girl.48 This causes her to be ‘full of 
vitality’, suggesting a sexual metaphor. Echoing this idea, the end of the fifth stanza implies 
that by turning on the computer (the ‘lighting’-like call in the darkness), the Green Dam Girl 
figuratively comes back to life. This gives the impression that her existence is defined by the 
sexual whims of the computer user. Once revived, she is then warmed by the user’s ‘firm chest’ 
and sighs (‘Aah!’), adding to the impression that her ‘rebirth’ is a sensual experience. Based on 
this understanding, it is quite possible that the ‘heaven’ which they fly towards at the end of 
the song is a symbolic orgasm. These points indicate that this song ostentatiously sexualises the 
Green Dam Girl and her relationship with the computer user. However, as these examples do 
not explicitly indicate that sexual activities are taking place, and because the song is set in an 
alternate virtual reality unlike our own, the song retains its ‘pure’, ‘innocent’ and ‘fantastical’ moe 
essence. We therefore have in this video a perfect example of Chinese internet users adopting 
the visual language, philosophy and pre-occupations of a Japanese subculture to satirise the 
Chinese state’s policing of the online realm.
Conclusion
At first glance, the Green Dam Girl may appear to be a typical Japanese manga or anime 
figure. A comprehensive reading of this character necessitates the combined knowledge 
of both Chinese and Japanese cultures. As the emblem of this critical counter narrative 
movement, the Green Dam Girl represents frustration stemming from the restriction of 
Japanese popular culture as well as the acceleration of Internet censorship. Through their 
glocalisation of moe and other features of Japanese popular culture within this movement, 
internet users were able to undermine Chinese authorities with the very thing they wished 
to eliminate. Thus, the Green Dam Girl is simultaneously a symbol of conflicting demands 
regarding both the accommodation of and resistance to Japanese popular culture in China.
Online spaces and cultures are difficult to police. Despite mechanisms for regulation, 
savvy internet users are adept at getting around controls, or using memes and technology to 
undermine controls, as this example shows. The Green Dam Girl first appeared seven years 
ago and technology has since considerably advanced, but this incident reminds us of the 
continuing struggle between freedom and control on the internet. Governments, technology 
companies and internet users are yet to find a satisfactory balance regarding this issue. In the 
47 Galbraith, ‘Moe: Exploring Virtual Potential’, para. 30.
48 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtE_n2CdPpg.
Saito
Cultural Studies Review,  Vol. 21, No. 1  March 2017  146
meantime, we are likely to witness many more incidents in which internet users wrestle for 
control over cyberspace.
Equally difficult to control, perhaps, is the penetration of Japanese manga and anime in 
China. Despite attempts of the Chinese government to discourage the public from consuming 
Japanese popular culture, devoted Chinese fans are yet to be persuaded. For example, Pokémon 
Go, an augmented reality mobile game and one of the latest additions to the Japanese Pokémon 
franchise, caught the gaming world by storm after its limited release in early July 2016. 
Observers have noted that for political and technological reasons this game is unlikely to be 
released in China. To meet the huge demand from Chinese gamers for Pokémon Go, a Chinese 
gaming company has created an imitation of the Japanese original, named City Spirit Go.49 
This not only demonstrates that Japanese popular culture is still sought after by Chinese fans, 
but also provides us with another example of the glocalisation of Japanese cultural artefacts 
in China.
Evidently, global popular culture may be localised in various ways. The use of Japanese 
manga and anime techniques by Chinese comics and animation companies shows us that 
producers are eager to capitalise on the popularity of foreign cultural imports. While there 
are obvious commercial reasons this is occurring, the Green Dam Girl incident presents 
us with an exception. As a Japanese anime-style virtual character created by anonymous 
Chinese internet users, her image was not used for financial gain or to meet government 
quotas for domestic animation broadcast. Instead, she was used in a politicised grassroots-
based campaign against censorship. Therefore, the Green Dam Girl illustrates how cultural 
arbitrage may be decided at unofficial levels and for unconventional means. Here, we can sense 
the salience of Otmazgin and Ben-Ari’s claim regarding the autonomy of popular culture.50 
Perhaps this case suggests that rather than governments and companies, ardent fans are in fact 
the final arbiters in matters of cultural influence.
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